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Abstract : Coherent one photon pulses are sent with four possible time delays with respect to a
reference. Ambiguity of the photon time detection resulting from pulses overlap combined with
interferometric measurement allows for secure key exchange.
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The information is coded on coherent one photon pulses with a square profile, a duration T and a chosen delay
with respect to a time reference. The delays are chosen by Alice so that possible pulses may overlap. Bob can perform
only one time measurement which may lead to an ambiguity on the delay evaluation. Bob sends at random half of the
pulses he receives to an unbalanced Mach-Zender interferometer (propagation time difference T/2 and phase difference
of pi) (Fig. 1) to ensure that he actually receives pulses of duration T [1]. The other arm of the input beamsplitter is sent
to the photon counter which is used to establish the key between Alice and Bob (Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1 : Principle of the experiment. Half of the photons received by Bob are used to establish the key. Half are sent to an
interferometer for pulse duration measurement
The protocol is modeled with a one photon states i  basis corresponding to successive pulses of duration T/2. The
states used in the protocols are of the form ( )1211, ++=+ iiii . In the two states protocol [1], Eve can exploit
the channel losses to eavesdrop the key. To overcome that limitation, we propose a protocol based on 4 states. Alice
sends at random, with equal probabilities, states 2,1 , 3,2 , 4,3 , 5,4  (delays 0, T/2, T, 3T/2 respectively). The
information is coded on states 3,2  and 4,3  (eg bit 0 and 1). Detection in time slot 3 do not allow to distinguish
between bits 0 and 1. The main difference with the two states protocol is that the useful time slots 2 and 4 are
ambiguous during the transmission of the raw key due to the possible emission of states 2,1  and 5,4  by Alice. When
Eve measures the pulse position, she has to resend a pulse of duration T, in the ideal case, to avoid a drop of the contrast
at Bob interferometer. She then unavoidably induces errors that Alice and Bob can detect comparing publicly part of the
raw key and measuring the QBER. After the transmission of the raw key, Alice reveals to Bob each time she has sent
states 2,1  or states 5,4  and discard the corresponding measurements. The detection in time slots 2 or 4 becomes non
ambiguous to Bob. He then reveals to Alice when this has occurred without revealing the result and discards the
ambiguous measurements in time slot 3. A secret key can thus be exchanged between Alice and Bob.
The state that can be resent by Eve can be evaluated as a function of the losses and decoherence induced by the
transmission, leading to the maximum allowed probability for Eve to intercept the pulse without being detected. Finally
one can calculate the information obtained on Alice by Eve (IAE) and Bob (IAB) respectively [2], as a function of the
QBER (Fig. 2). The security criterion IAB > IAE [2] gives a maximum acceptable value of the QBER of 17 % (with no
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decoherence). One advantage is that there is no need to implement an interferometer between Alice and Bob. One need
to synchronize precisely two clocks between Alice and Bob and to keep the coherence of the pulses through the
propagation.
Fig. 2 : Information of Bob on Alice (IAB) and Eve on Alice (IAE) for a decoherence of 0, 10, 20, 50 % of the pulses
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